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evidence from fiscal 
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Hoang-Phuong Nguyen
Like other developing countries, Vietnam has attempted to 
push for greater fiscal decentralization in the hope of a more 
efficient delivery of social services to targeted citizens. The fiscal 
decentralization initiative is encouraging and merits pursuit, 
but the present study however, shows that a misstep in the 
decentralization process can discriminate disproportionately 
against the poor. Specifically, an increase in the sub-provincial 
share of the total provincial expenditures is predicted to bring 
about an appreciable decrease in the lowest-quintile average 
monthly income. We suggest that the Vietnamese government 
require provinces to adopt pro-poor allocation norms rather 
than reclaiming its control over the provincial expenditure 
assignment. This paper’s empirical findings sound a note of 
considerable caution that other developing countries should 
exercise in their fiscal decentralization efforts to avoid creating 
unintended consequences for the poor.
IntroductIon
This paper investigates the effects of decentralized public expenditures 
created by Vietnam’s State Budget Law (SBL) in 2002 on poverty al-
leviation. Fiscal decentralization is the process of endowing sub-national 
governments with more taxing powers and autonomy in decisions on 
expenditures. Results of research are still inconclusive regarding the effects 
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of fiscal decentralization on a country’s social and economic development, 
but almost all developing countries have embarked upon some type of 
fiscal decentralization initiative (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003). 
More attention has recently been focused on researching the effects of 
fiscal decentralization on social outcomes, particularly on poverty allevia-
tion. However, no studies have explored the impact of greater autonomy 
in expenditure decision-making accorded to Vietnamese provinces on the 
amelioration of poverty. This paper attempts to fill the current gap in this 
increasingly growing field.
Since the adoption of the doi moi, or renovation, policy in 1986, Vietnam 
has experienced developments in several socio-economic aspects, includ-
ing poverty alleviation. The developmental path has included attempts 
towards greater administrative, economical, and fiscal decentralization. 
The government of Vietnam passed the SBL in 2002 with great fanfare. 
Becoming effective in 2004, the law was considered a remarkable develop-
ment in the process of fiscal decentralization, and, thus, was expected to 
lead to a better delivery of social services. The 2002 SBL features a new 
mechanism for expenditure assignments whereby the central government 
grants provinces autonomy to allocate spending responsibilities to lower-
level governments. Given the relative importance of poverty alleviation 
on Vietnam’s national agenda and of expenditure assignment, the intent 
of this paper is to specifically explore how much the new expenditure 
assignments under the 2002 SBL have actually helped, or impeded, the 
country’s efforts to reduce poverty (Government of Vietnam (henceforth 
GVN) 2005, 5; Martinez-Vazquez 2001, 1).1
Vietnam has enjoyed an encouraging downward trend in general poverty 
rates by region across Vietnam (See Table 1 and Figure 1).  The already-
high income inequity in 2002, however, increased by a substantial margin 
in a majority of provinces in 2004. Such inequity is reason to suspect that 
fiscal decentralization has indeed exerted a negative impact on the poor. 
In fact, much literature has noted the possible adverse effect of fiscal de-
centralization on resource-strapped provinces and districts. For instance, 
Fritzen (2006, 3) argues that fiscal decentralization will strengthen the 
resources and discretion of fiscally better-off and densely populated prov-
inces and districts more than those of poorer ones. Therefore, this paper 
conducts an econometric test of the hypothesis that a higher degree of 
fiscal decentralization leads to a decrease in the poorest people’s monthly 
income, which is a proxy for poverty.
To that end, this study proceeds as follows. The conceptual background 
provides working definitions of the key concepts of fiscal decentralization 
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and poverty. The background section also discusses factors influencing a 
developing country’s adoption of fiscal decentralization initiatives, and 
briefly reviews the literature on the relationship between fiscal decentral-
ization and poverty reduction in general and specifically in Vietnam. The 
next section describes the hierarchy of governmental structures and the 
budget-making process in Vietnam, elaborating why the new SBL-regulated 
expenditure assignment might benefit the rich more than the poor. In 
the empirical estimation section, I will develop an econometric model to 
test the above-mentioned hypothesis and report estimation results. I then 
discuss the results, analyze possible policy options to address the identified 
problem, and recommend which policy options the government should 
undertake. The final section concludes the paper with suggestions for 
future research.
conceptual Background
Definitions
Two key notions of fiscal decentralization and poverty need elaboration. 
First, decentralization as an umbrella term refers to the process of transferring 
authority and responsibility from the central government to sub-national 
governmental bodies. As “a core component of decentralization” (Rondinelli 
1999, 3), fiscal decentralization has been defined in several ways. The paper 
employs the following definition of fiscal decentralization developed by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for analytical purposes: 
“Fiscal decentralization . . .  constitutes the public finance dimension to 
decentralization in general, defining how and in what way expenditures and 
revenues are organized between and across different levels of government 
in the national polity” [italics original] (UNDP 2005, 2).
Poverty can be defined in relation to others or according to biological 
necessities (Sen 1981, 11-17). For econometric estimation, the definition 
of poverty in the paper is oriented towards the biological approach, using 
average monthly income. Although income may not be a perfect measure of 
poverty, income data is more accessible and widely used by researchers.
What Causes Developing Countries to Embrace Fiscal 
Decentralization?
Developing countries adopt fiscal decentralization for various reasons. 
First, in a complex world fraught with national territorial disintegration, 
fiscal decentralization can be seen as an appropriate venue to defuse po-
tential political and social tensions and unrest. This is particularly true 
of Indonesia, where the high probability of provincial separatism in the 
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fragile post-Suharto era made sub-provincial governments more favored 
(White and Smoke 2005, 4). 
Second, democratization can also be an important trigger for the general 
process of decentralization and specifically for fiscal decentralization. The 
collapse of authoritarian regimes in the Philippines in 1986 and Indonesia 
in 1997 fueled demand for more local autonomy. Democratization char-
acterized by greater political pluralism and the demise of the dominant-
party system was the central force leading to decentralization in Mexico 
(Díaz-Cayeros 2004, 2).
Third, structural and economic changes could be a catalyst for fiscal 
decentralization. As noted by White and Smoke (2005), continuous 
periods of significant economic growth and urbanization create growing 
pressure on the central government to provide public services in a faster 
and more efficient fashion via fiscal decentralization. This scenario is help-
ful to account for Vietnam’s adoption of fiscal decentralization initiative 
culminating in the current SBL. The factors of economic growth and 
urbanization are present in the case of Vietnam. Growth in Vietnam has 
been significantly high for more than a decade (See Figure 2). Although 
Vietnam’s annual growth rate has lagged behind that of China, it has been 
considerably higher than the average for low-income countries and well 
above the world average. Figure 3 indicates that the percentage of people 
living in urban areas has steadily increased since 1990, which is another 
sign of economic development. 
Literature Review on Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty
Earlier research focused heavily on the impact of fiscal decentralization 
on development in general (Bahl 1999; Schroeder 2003), and on aspects 
of development other than poverty, such as corruption (Arikan 2004; Fis-
man and Gatti 2002), public service delivery (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006), and health (Lieberman, Capuno, and Hoang 2005). More research 
attention has recently been paid to the link between decentralization and 
poverty. Most studies, however, look into the impact of decentralization on 
poverty in all three of its forms: political, administrative and fiscal (Braun 
and Grote 2000; Jütting et al. 2004).2 
Scholars in related fields of development and public finance agree that 
fiscal decentralization and poverty are indeed correlated. They have at-
tempted to come up with a general framework to exactly account for how 
fiscal decentralization affects poverty. The frameworks presented by Jütting 
et al. (2004) and Braun and Grote (2000) identify the economic influence 
of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction via higher efficiency and bet-
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ter targeting. Despite the fact that centrally-provided investment in certain 
public areas enjoys economies of scale and size, it would be more efficient 
for lower levels of government to expend the majority of public services. 
Local governments are expected to be in a better position to identify their 
local needs (including those of the poor) and to deliver public services 
accordingly (UNDP 2005, 7). In other words, the efficiency advantage in 
combating poverty that lower-level governments enjoy relative to higher-
level governments comes from the former’s local knowledge and relative 
proximity to the target population – the impoverished.
Efficiency in public expenditures comes not only from better localized 
knowledge but also from greater accountability and inter-jurisdictional 
competition. More fiscal decentralization tends to entail a higher degree of 
accountability. Local governments now become more accountable to higher 
levels of government and to their local citizens. Greater accountability is 
more likely to be an incentive for local governments to improve efficiency 
in delivery of public services. Inter-regional competition might be able 
to improve efficiency by loosening the grip of local rent-seekers and the 
corrupt and by promoting government innovations (Shah 2007, 4).
Several reports and papers have examined various aspects of fiscal 
decentralization in Vietnam (Fritzen 2006; Gao 2000; Malesky 2004; 
Martinez-Vazquez 2004; Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez 2005; Pham 
2006). Still, the study by Rao, Bird and, Litvack (1998) is the only one 
that examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty. They argue 
that both general and specific transfers are needed to improve local capac-
ity and to provide safety nets, thus, ameliorating poverty. Further research 
needs to be done on fiscal decentralization in Vietnam. The paper by Rao, 
Bird, and Litvack (1998) only looked closely into one aspect of fiscal de-
centralization, namely, inter-governmental transfers. None of the studies 
has explored the expenditure assignment implications of the 2002 SBL on 
poverty reduction, which is the purpose of the current paper. 
FIscal decentralIzatIon In VIetnam
The government of Vietnam has four levels: the central government and 
three lower government levels composed of fifty-nine provinces3 and five 
provincial-level cities4 under the direct jurisdiction of the central govern-
ment, 643 units at the district level, and 10,602 units at the communal 
level (See Figure 4 for a complete structure). Each level of government 
has a popularly elected legislative body, the People’s Council, and an 
executive authority, the People’s Committee, which is appointed by the 
People’s Council.
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The budget-making authority in Vietnam is highly hierarchical and fol-
lows a nested or Matruska doll model. On the one hand, budgets at lower 
levels of government need to be approved by both the People’s Council at 
their level and that at a higher level of government. On the other hand, 
departments at the communal, district, and provincial levels report their 
budget vertically to the respective line ministry. All budgets are eventu-
ally consolidated in the State Budget. Under the 2002 SBL, the National 
Assembly of Vietnam (NAV)5 approves the estimated and realized state 
budget. In addition, NAV has legislative power over the state budget’s 
composition and, in particular, the allocations to line ministries, central 
agencies, cities, and provinces (Article 15). Whereas financing norms used 
to be established by the Ministry of Finance, they now have to be submit-
ted to the NAV Standing Committee for review.6 
The process of fiscal decentralization in Vietnam began with the 1990 
enactment of the Council of Ministers’ Resolution 186/HDBT on Fiscal 
Decentralization to Local Governments. The resolution was enacted as 
part of the attempt at renovation. Despite lack of sophistication, it served 
as a sound foundation for later developments in budget laws and regula-
tions. The resolution specified only central and provincial budget levels. 
A note-worthy point in expenditure assignment under the resolution is 
that provincial governments can keep one-hundred percent of the savings 
from assigned expenditures (Section II, Article 6, Clause a).
The 1996 State Budget Law and its amendments in 1998 demonstrated 
the considerable strides made by the government in fiscal decentralization. 
The law explicitly created a four-level budget-making hierarchy encompass-
ing the central, provincial, district, and communal authorities. The law 
expanded the fiscal responsibilities of provincial government, and set up 
a stable framework for inter-governmental transfers, whereby provincial 
revenue shares would be relatively fixed for several years at a time before 
being renegotiated (Fritzen 2006, 3).
Building onto the 1996 law, the most recent budget document of the 
2002 SBL was enacted in 2002 and went in effect in January 2004, which 
was the beginning of that  fiscal year. The nature of expenditure assignment 
responsibilities that is regulated by the 2002 SBL is quite unique relative 
to common practice in other developing countries. Previously, like other 
countries, expenditure responsibilities were clearly defined in law for three 
sub-national levels of government. As the 2002 SBL regulates, provinces in 
Vietnam are given a budget envelope and it remains under their purview 
to assign expenditure responsibilities to sub-provincial governments. The 
rationale for the change is to allow provinces to adapt to diverse conditions 
prevalent in their jurisdictions.
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Nevertheless, the new well-meaning pattern of expenditure assignment 
might bring about differential effects on dissimilar groups of population. 
According to Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez (2005, 356), the expenditure 
assignment provisions in the 2002 SBL are “vague enough to allow for 
important geographical variation in sub-provincial assignments of expendi-
ture responsibilities.” In other words, the new SBL-mandated expenditure 
assignment might make the poor worse off as provincial governments 
spend more on urban districts where richer citizens overwhelmingly out-
number the poorer, and, consequently, much less on rural districts where 
a predominant number of poor people live. 
This could happen for the two reasons. First, the lack of centrally-
determined mandatory spending norms for intra-provincial allocation 
of funds enables provincial governments to develop their own budget 
norms.7 Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez (2005) note that unlike the per 
capita-based central budgeting norms,8 the provincially-developed norms 
have retained physical criteria that the central government long abandoned. 
More importantly, the criteria discriminate in favor of richer districts 
and locations with larger built-in capacities. The lack of pro-poor intra-
provincial budgeting norms might reflect the fact that provincial budget 
officers need more time to be able to adapt their budgeting norms relevant 
to the specific poverty circumstances of their territories.
Second, better-educated citizens who live in physically advantaged dis-
tricts tend to have more immediate access to provincial government officials 
whose offices are also located in urban districts. They are thus able to exert 
greater influence or pressure on the officials to tip the expenditure balance 
in favor of public services that will increase their income. A large major-
ity of poor people who tend to live at a greater distance from provincial 
government officials find it harder to have their voices heard. As a result, 
resources spent by provincial governments have much less positive impact 
on the poorer people’s livelihoods or income. Budgeting norms that do 
not take into account true local needs render the biggest advancement in 
the 2002 SBL’s expenditure assignment counter-productive.
empIrIcal estImatIon
Econometric Model
The following model is an attempt to test the hypothesis that the assign-
ment of provincial expenditures, or the degree of fiscal decentralization in 
expenditures, adopted by the 2002 SBL has had a differentially unfavorable 
impact on the poor. To test the hypothesis, the following econometric 
model is used.
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Υit = α0 + α1Dit + α2Χit + α3t t+ μi + εit     (1)
Υit is the logged average monthly income of the lowest income quintile 
in province i at time t; Dit is the degree of fiscal decentralization in public 
expenditures in province i at time t. Xit is a vector of control variables 
representing the provincial expenditures and capacity; t t is a dummy vari-
able equal to unity for 2004 and 0 otherwise; α3 indicates the time trend 
effect on the change in the dependent variable; μi represents provincial 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics, and εit is the error term over 
time and province.
As indicated earlier, the 2002 SBL accords provinces with greater 
autonomy to delegate spending obligations to districts and communes. 
To describe the degree of fiscal decentralization, most cross-country 
analyses use the sub-national share of the total government expenditure/
revenue or of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is taken from 
the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary 
Fund. Although this measurement approach presents three problems,9 
there is currently no better measure of fiscal decentralization (Ebel and 
Yilmaz 2003, 103). Following the traditional studies, the degree of fiscal 
decentralization, D, in expenditures in equation (1) is measured by the 
ratio of expenditures by the districts and communes in a province to the 
total provincial spending. 
A possible concern about the model’s internal validity is the simultaneity 
between the dependent variable and decentralization. The extent to which 
expenditures are fiscally decentralized in a province might be driven by 
how poor it is. However, this is unlikely since budget allocation norms 
from provinces to districts and communes still rely heavily on physical 
inputs, such as the number of schools or hospital beds.
Unobserved heterogeneity among provinces, μi, might systematically 
influence the poor’s average monthly income, thus producing biased 
estimates. The most important unobserved, or hard-to-measure, factors 
that do not change within a district have much to do with efficiency in 
delivery of social services, especially those targeted at the poor. The follow-
ing section discusses two important determinants of efficiency in public 
expenditures.10
First, the lack of cooperation in budget allocation between provincial 
governments and line ministries may lead to inefficiency in public expen-
ditures that aim to generally improve social outcomes or to specifically 
reduce poverty. While line ministries are responsible for the overall financing 
scheme for the sector, provincial governments allocate budgets for their 
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entire jurisdiction. Cooperation mechanisms between line ministries and 
local governments are not even regulated in the 2002 SBL. Article 24 in 
the SBL about ministerial responsibilities in budgeting process is silent 
on such a necessary cooperation. That is also true of Articles 25 and 26 
regarding responsibilities of provincial People’s Councils and Committees 
in the budgeting process. Martinez-Vazquez (2005, 21) notes that the cur-
rent legislation does not provide clear guidance on which government body 
has competence to regulate the delivery of a certain social service, which 
is obligated to finance the service delivery, and which is to implement it.
Second, whereas outstanding performance in revenue is highly rewarded, 
all forms of district or communal incentives for improved efficiency in the 
delivery of social services to the disadvantaged are non-existent. For instance, 
as a reward for revenue collections, Bo Trach Commune in Quang Binh 
Province funded a trip to China for forty-four communal officials (Toan 
2007). Incentives for local officials to become more efficient are still lack-
ing because no specific legal document has provided transparent efficiency 
indicators of local government expenditure performance. In other words, 
the concept of performance budgeting is not incorporated in budgeting 
allocations at least at the sub-national level, which is understandable given 
Vietnam’s level of development.11
Provincial heterogeneity in the two factors might bias estimation re-
sults. Nevertheless, the two aforementioned efficiency-related factors are 
assumed to remain unchanged, or to change negligibly, within a two-year 
time frame. Put differently, they are included in the term μi. The prob-
lem of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity among provinces can be 
solved with our panel data by differencing two periods of data. μi is then 
cancelled out. 
∆Y
it
 = α
1
 ∆D
it 
+ α
2
 ∆X
it
 + α3 ∆t t+ ∆εit     (2)
Equation (2) will be used for estimation with robust standard errors 
to address the concern that provinces might have heteroskedastic errors 
because of the considerable diversity among provinces in Vietnam.
Data Description 
The websites of the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Vietnam 
General Statistics Office (GSO) supply data for the estimation (See Table 
2 for descriptive statistics). The econometric model employs data for 2002 
and 2004, when the new SBL first became effective. Although there were 
sixty-four provinces and cities in Vietnam, the number of observations in 
the model is only forty. Three provinces were split into six smaller ones 
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at the beginning of 2004.12 The other provinces are excluded because of 
mismatched and missing data between 2002 and 2004.13 However, forty 
provinces are believed to be representative of the entire country of Vietnam 
as each of the seven regions has at least one province in the datasets. 
The dependent variables are the natural log of the lowest-quintile average 
monthly income measured in thousands of Vietnamese dongs (VND).14 
Vietnam Statistical Yearbooks published by GSO report only regional 
poverty rates and the average monthly income earned by the five income 
quintiles. They do not publish provincial poverty rates or the average 
monthly income of those who are under the poverty line. Nevertheless, 
the lowest average monthly income quintile, the dependent variable in 
equation (2), is still a good measure of poverty. Following the guidelines 
advocated by the World Bank, general poverty rates15 computed by GSO 
are in fact also based on average monthly income levels (GSO 2006, 608). 
In 2002, thirty-seven out of forty provinces report the lowest-quintile 
average monthly income which is smaller than the poverty-line average 
monthly income. There are thirty such provinces in 2004.16 
The control variables in Χit consist of the log of provincial expendi-
tures,17 provincial capacity indicators and structural characteristics. Capacity 
indicators are the natural logs of per capita agricultural, industrial (both 
in billions of VND), and fishing (in metric tons) production. Greater 
capacity in agriculture, industry, and fisheries is expected to be positively 
correlated with the livelihood of poor people. Provincial structural variables 
are the proportion of females and of those who live in rural areas. The 
percentages of female and rural population in a province are expected to 
be related negatively and positively, respectively, with the average monthly 
income of the poor.
Estimation Results
The estimation produces expected results. A higher degree of fiscal decen-
tralization is predicted to lead to a decrease in poor people’s income (See 
Table 3). Specifically, a one-percent increase in the sub-provincial share of 
the total provincial expenditures, which is a proxy for fiscal decentralization, 
is expected to result in a 0.39 percent decrease in the lowest-quintile average 
monthly income. The result is statistically significant at the 95 percent level 
in both models (standard and robust). Provincial expenditures, industrial 
production, and agricultural production are both positively correlated with 
the income of the poor. Specifically, a 1.0 percent increase in provincial 
expenditures is predicted to lead to a 0.14 percent increase in the lowest-
quintile average monthly income. Similarly, the average monthly income 
79
What is in it for the Poor? 
Evidence from Fiscal Decentralization in Vietnam
of the poorest is expected to rise by 0.08 or 0.15 percent as a result of a 
1.0 increase in agricultural or industrial production respectively. The larger 
elasticity of the agricultural production relative to that of the industrial 
production implies that the expansion of agriculture has a greater impact 
on the poor. This implication is in line with the fact that 80 percent of 
Vietnam’s population are farmers.
The above results correspond with the highly significant effects of 
the shares of rural and female population. As rural areas have a higher 
concentration of poor people, a 1.0 percent increase in rural population 
will have a 0.8 percent decrease in the income of the poorest. The signifi-
cantly positive coefficient of the percent of female population means that 
women could be better at fighting against their abject poverty. Finally, 
the income of the poor is predicted to be 12.74 percent higher in 2004 
than that in 2002. 
dIscussIons
The estimation result has an important policy implication. Left to their own 
devices, provinces are expected to allocate funds against the best interest of 
the poor. Seeking greater fiscal centralization by empowering provinces with 
expenditure flexibility is not a guarantee of pro-poor resource allocations. 
Although increased provincial ability to adapt to diversity has some merit, 
many countries as diverse as Vietnam have managed to work with defined 
expenditure assignments at all levels of government (Martinez-Vazquez 
2005, 20). The government of Vietnam can implement two possible 
policy options to ensure that the poor benefit from fiscal decentraliza-
tion initiatives. First, the central government might want to continue 
bestowing provinces with the authority to allocate budgets among their 
sub-provincial governments. However, the government would require that 
the current centrally-adopted pro-poor budgeting norms be embraced in 
budgetary allocation decisions at the provincial level. Budgeting norms 
are considered to be pro-poor if budget expenditures are more sensitive to 
the interests of the poor.18 To make the option more effective, the central 
government would need to provide detailed instructions on what criteria 
are incorporated in the budgeting norms for which areas of social needs. 
In doing so, provinces with a relatively larger number of impoverished 
people can benefit more from fiscal decentralization. The second option 
that the Vietnamese government might want to pursue is reinstating ex-
penditure assignment regulations in the previous SBL that clearly define 
the expenditure norms of sub-provincial. The norms would be replicated 
on those currently being employed by the central government. 
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Under the four criteria of poverty reduction, greater fiscal decentraliza-
tion, minimum implementation costs, and maximum feasibility, the first 
option proves to be a dominant choice for the government. Although both 
options will diminish poverty at a greater scale in poverty-concentrated 
provinces, the first one is preferable based on the other three criteria. 
Implementing the second option would run counter to the fiscal decen-
tralization trend that Vietnam has been trying to push forward. Plus, the 
first option would cost less than the second one because the latter involves 
amendments to the SBL. It would take more time to amend the law than 
to issue a Directive, or Circular, to implement the first option. The second 
option also has possible feasibility problems. The government might have 
a hard time selling the idea of amending the SBL to the NAV and would 
face stronger opposition from fiscally decentralized provinces. After being 
used to allocating funds on their own for a couple of years, provinces would 
be more resolutely opposed to being deprived of the allocational right by 
the central government. Though they would not like following certain 
budgeting norms outlined by the first option, their resistance would be 
much less fierce relative to the second option.
conclusIon
Like other developing countries, Vietnam has made attempts to push for 
greater fiscal decentralization in the hope of a more efficient delivery of 
social services to targeted citizens. The fiscal decentralization initiative is 
encouraging and merits pursuit. However, the finding of this paper might 
help the Vietnamese government and policy makers to understand how a 
misstep in the decentralization process can discriminate disproportionately 
against the poor. Specifically, a 1.0 percent increase in the sub-provincial 
share of the total provincial expenditures is predicted to bring about a 0.39 
percent decrease in the lowest-quintile average monthly income. We suggest 
that the government require provinces to adopt pro-poor allocation norms 
rather than reclaiming its control over the provincial expenditure assignment. 
What warrants future research is the interaction between the assignment of 
sub-provincial expenditures made by provinces and by line ministries. The 
effect of fiscal decentralization on corruption among Vietnamese government 
officials is also a topic worthy of significant research attention.
To conclude, this paper’s empirical findings sound a note of considerable 
caution regarding how fiscal decentralization in developing countries can 
adversely impact the poor. If they are going to promote the interests of the 
poor, developing countries should implement fiscal decentralization with 
great care to avoid the erroneous steps Vietnam has made.
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notes
1 In addition to local government expenditures on poverty-related social programs, 
the central government established a nation-wide program called Hunger 
Eradication and Poverty Alleviation. In 2000, Vietnam also committed itself 
to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the first of which is eradi-
cating extreme poverty and hunger (GVN 2005, 5). As the first pillar of fiscal 
decentralization reform, assignment of fiscal responsibilities should be deter-
mined first and foremost. As Martinez-Vazquez (2001, 1) puts it, designing 
other fiscal decentralization pillars, namely, revenue assignment, patterns of 
inter-governmental transfers, or sub-national borrowing, before expenditure 
assignment is just like putting the cart before the horse.
2 In their fiscal decentralization case studies of China, India, Ghana and Egypt, 
Braun and Grote (2000) found that the process was postively correlated with 
development.
3 The number of provinces in Vietnam has increased by 60% in five sets of provin-
cial divisions since 1990. Malesky (2005, 1) argued that provincial separation 
came from the gerrymandering strategy adopted by reformists who wanted to 
free reform-oriented provinces from provinces dominated by the state-owned 
enterprise sector.
4 They are Can Tho, Da Nang, Ha Noi, Hai Phong, and Ho Chi Minh City. 
5 The unicameral NAV is elected to a five-year term by popular vote. The current 
twelfth term has 491 deputies, and the vast majority of them are party members 
and recommended for election by the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, which is 
an organization closely affiliated with the Communist Party. NAV convenes 
its meetings twice a year. 
6 When NAV is not in session, the Standing Committee takes charge on behalf 
of NAV.
7 However, the 2002 SBL requires that districts provide all levels of public edu-
cation, lighting, water supply and sewerage, urban traffic, and other public 
infrastructure (Article 34, Clause 1d). 
8 Central budgetary expenditure norms are applied for fiscal transfers from the 
central government to provinces. The norms classify districts and communes 
into four categories: urban, rural, low mountain, and high mountain regions. 
Currently, eleven central norms are applied to estimate provincial expenditure 
needs in education, training, health, administration costs, information and 
culture, television and radio broadcasts, sports, social protection, national 
defense and security, economic activities, technology, and science (Martinez-
Vazquez and Gomez 2005, 361). The central government has tried to make 
the budgeting norms for central-provincial transfers as pro-poor as possible. 
See Note 27 for more discussions.
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9 Ebel and Yilmaz (2003, 105) identify the three problems: (a) GFS does not identify 
the degree of local expenditure autonomy; (b) GFS does not distinguish sources 
of revenue; and (c) GFS does not indicate what proportion of intergovernmental 
transfers is categorial (or conditional) vis-à-vis lumpsum.
10 This is not to say that other determinants of expenditure efficiency, such as cor-
ruption or mis-targeting, are not important. They are not discussed at length 
because they are less closely related to the 2002 SBL, which is the focus of my 
analysis. However, I can reasonably assume that levels of corruption and mis-
targeting are also consistent over time.
11 Let us take the United States for instance. Although performance budgeting was 
first initiated by members of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in 
the early 20th century (Williams 2003, 643), it still faces several challenges to 
completely replace line-item budgeting (Kong 2005, 91). There is considerable 
disagreement on what should be appropriate measures of improved performance 
in expenditures: outcomes vs. outputs, long term vs. short term, observable vs. 
unobservable, and others.
12 Lai Chau was split into the new Lai Chau and Dien Bien, Dak Lak into the 
new Dak Lak and Dac Nong, and Can Tho into the municipal Can Tho and 
Hau Giang.
13 The MOF websites give access to only 2004 budgets of forty-nine provinces, 
whereas it provides access to a similar number of provinces for the fiscal year 
of 2002. Some provincial budgets were published in 2004 but not in 2002 
and vice versa.
14 The exchange rate of VND/USD was between 15,050VND/USD and 
15,740VND/USD during the period of 2002-2004 (EIU 2005, 48).
15 GSO computes two poverty rates (general and food). General poverty rates have 
a higher cut-off income level than food poverty rates. Whereas the latter further 
categorize income levels into rural and urban citizens, the former do not.
16 The cut-off average monthly incomes for general poverty rates are VND 160,000 
and VND 170,000 for 2002 and 2004 respectively. Depending on the exchange 
rates, one was considered to be poor if he or she earned approximately USD 
11 per month in 2002 and 2004.
17 Provinces’ expenditures come from their local revenue and transfers from the 
central government. 
18 The 2003 government decision represents an example of pro-poor budgeting. It 
requires the use of school-aged children instead of children enrolled in school 
as a budgeting norm in education transfers. The norm gives a school-aged child 
in a rural area 1.7 times more money than an urban student (Pham 2006, 17). 
See DESA (2005) for further discussions on pro-poor budgeting.
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appendIces
Table 1. General Poverty Ratesa (%) by Region
1995 1996 1999 2002 2004
Red River Delta 29.1 26.6 21.6 22.4 12.1
North East and
North West
47.2 45.2 40.6 53.2b 44.0b
North Central Coast 46.9 45.1 40.3 43.9 31.9
South Central Coast 33.9 32.7 28.8 25.2 19.0
Central Highlands 48.6 45.4 40.1 51.8 33.1
North East South 27.6 26.8 20.1 10.6 5.4
Mekong River Delta 31.8 29.1 23.7 23.4 19.5
a General poverty rates are calculated by determining a cut-off level of average 
monthly expenditures. 
b Data for North East and North West in 2002 and 2004 are reported by 
North East and North West separately. Data presented are the averages of 
the two.
Source: Vietnam Statistical Yearbooks.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log of the Lowest-Quin-
tile Average Monthly 
Income in 2002
40 4.809 0.203 4.446 5.321
Log of the Lowest-Quin-
tile Average Monthly 
Income in 2004
40 5.058 0.222 4.605 5.654
Sub-provincial Share of 
the Total Provincial Ex-
penditures in 2002 (%)
40 35.232 13.063 10.434 60.014
Sub-provincial Share of 
the Total Provincial Ex-
penditures in 2004 (%)
40 44.493 13.818 8.289 71.289
Log of provincial expen-
ditures in 2002 40 13.662 0.392 12.936 15.309
Log of provincial expen-
ditures in 2004 40 14.182 0.438 13.577 15.816
Log of per capita Agri-
cultural Production in 
2002
40 0.448 0.554 -1.114 1.145
Log of per capita Agri-
cultural Production in 
2004
40 0.473 0.572 -1.190 1.195
Log of per capita Indus-
trial Production in 2002 40 0.891 0.966 -1.355 3.561
Log of per capita Indus-
trial Production in 2004 40 1.359 0.990 -0.851 4.264
Log of Fishery Produc-
tion in 2002 40 3.167 1.393 -0.446 5.183
Log of Fishery Produc-
tion in 2004 40 3.378 1.308 1.009 5.323
Percent of Population 
who live in Rural Areas 
in 2002
40 0.789 0.138 0.180 0.939
Percent of Population 
who live in Rural Areas 
in 2004
40 0.782 0.139 0.205 0.928
Percent of Female Popu-
lation in 2002 40 0.509 0.005 0.499 0.522
Percent of Female Popu-
lation in 2004 40 0.510 0.006 0.497 0.521
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Table 3. Estimation Results
Time and District Fixed Effects for 2002-2004
Variables Coefficients t-statistics
t-statistics
(Robust)
Degree of fiscal 
decentralization
-0.0039 -2.17** -1.96**
Log of provincial expenditures 0.1425 3.34*** 2.82***
Log of industrial production 0.0820 4.30*** 4.26***
Log of agricultural production 0.1458 4.20*** 4.19***
Log of fisheries production -0.0080 -0.63 -0.55
% of rural population -0.0082 -4.79*** -4.85***
% of female population 0.0836 2.82*** 3.06***
Time dummy variable 
(2004=1)
0.1274 3.37*** 3.09***
Intercept -0.5645 -0.33 -0.35
***p<0.01, **p<0.05
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Source: World Development Indicators.
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